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by Scott Moreland, Program Manager, Security Cooperation Studies and Exercises Program, Center for Civil-Military 
Relations, Naval Postgraduate School 
The 2017 peace accord between the Colombian Government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or 
FARC, is an historic achievement that must be reinforced by defense sector readiness. Despite the FARC Secretariat’s 
reconciliation overtures, the FARC and its network is a hybrid threat that is likely to continue to plague the region. Past 
precedent and current trends indicate that the FARC will either evolve or entirely re-invent itself in order to protect and 
expand its criminal enterprise and regenerate its influence in the region. 
The FARC and Hybrid Threats 
Colombia is at an historic crossroad. After four years of dialogue, a ceasefire agreement was signed on 23 June 2016 
between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armada Revolucionarios de Colombia. The ceasefire offers hope for 
an end to what has long seemed an intractable internal conflict. 
Even as the political leaders pursue peace and reconciliation, the defense sector must recognize the FARC as a hybrid 
threat in transition. Early evidence suggests that the FARC will adapt in the short term, with an aim to regain a measure 
of popular support, protect and expand its lucrative and sprawling drug trafficking enterprise, and reconstitute a 
paramilitary capability. The latter is likely to manifest as a hybrid cellular network of affiliates that includes insurgent and 
terrorist ideologues, opportunistic and violent criminal gangs, and possibly even former military leaders from vulnerable 
states such as Venezuela and Nicaragua. Colombia’s defense forces must remain vigilant against this hybrid threat in order 
to provide lasting and legitimate security for all of its citizens. 
While certainly momentous, the FARC’s willing transition from an active insurgency to a valid political party is not 
unprecedented. In recent history, groups as varied as the Basque region’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) have successfully laid down arms and worked to establish a legitimate political voice within existing 
government frameworks. More recently, the erstwhile terrorist organization, Hezbollah, is exploring a path to 
disarmament as it aspires to a more mainstream role in Lebanon’s political structure. Indeed, the self-proclaimed “Party 
of God” already occupies 23 seats in the Lebanese Parliament and its military wing is working closely with the Lebanese 
military to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 Hezbollah’s potential evolution towards a viable and official 
stakeholder in Lebanese governance provides one relevant case with lessons that might be applied to the FARC’s 
transition. 
Hezbollah has frequently been characterized as a hybrid threat actor. Hybrid threats are broadly recognized as an emerging 
category of threats possessing distinct attributes and capabilities that set them apart from traditional insurgent or terrorist 
groups. Hybrid threats are distinguished by their extra-regional influence and their access to high-end military and 
information warfare capabilities. The US Army describes hybrid threats as a “diverse and dynamic combination of regular 
forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects.”2 The Army’s definition 
appears to be influenced by Frank Hoffman’s description of Hezbollah as a “hybrid threat” in the wake of the 2006 Second 
Lebanon War. Hoffman was among the first to propose a set of hybrid threat characteristics. Based on analysis of 
Hoffman’s work and evolving hybrid threat features, a set of recurring and relevant hybrid threat attributes emerges: 
x Blended Tactics. Hybrid threats combine conventional military capabilities with small-unit guerrilla tactics, 
asymmetric attacks, and mobile standoff engagement systems. 
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x Flexible structures. Hybrid threats are generally composed of paramilitary-type forces that can organize both in 
conventional military formations and as small, distributed cells. Hybrid threats create a governance component 
to establish stability and sustain operations. 
x Terrorism. Hybrid threats utilize terror campaigns to proliferate hate and despair and to strike fear in 
adversaries. 
x Disregard for international law. Hybrid threats cynically view international laws as a constraint upon their 
adversaries that can be exploited. 
x Information warfare. Hybrid threats exploit information networks to promote ideological messages, spread 
misinformation, raise funds, recruit fighters, and operate covertly. 
x Organized criminal activity. Hybrid threats use crime and fundraising as reliable sources of revenue to fight, 
train, recruit, govern, and sustain operations. 
It is important to note that many of these attributes infer an unstable set of security conditions wherein hybrid threats 
thrive. Generally, hybrid threats will seek spaces where they can act with impunity, where governance is limited or non-
existent, and where a committed and capable conventional response is unlikely. Hybrid threats will also tend to prefer to 
operate obliquely and achieve their aims below the threshold of open conflict until such time as they can confidently 
exploit a conventionally disadvantaged or constrained adversary. This set of hybrid threat attributes and operational 
conditions has been applied to Hezbollah in Lebanon in previous studies, but it might just as easily pertain to the FARC as 
it has evolved over the last 60 years in the Colombian hinterland.3 
The FARC emerged in 1966 as a traditional guerilla army pursuing a communist ideology. In its early years, the FARC 
garnered support and a recruiting base from remote villagers who felt disenfranchised by Colombia’s central government. 
The FARC provided educational and medical services to loyal communities, and received a steady flow of recruits for its 
militant training camps in return. 
Initially, the FARC preferred time-honored guerilla tactics, especially kidnapping. Then, as it became more heavily involved 
in cocaine trafficking throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the FARC enjoyed a massive influx of revenue that allowed it to 
expand exponentially. By the mid-1990s, the FARC had grown into a formidable military force, fielding 27 battalions of 
militant fighters. From 1996 to 1998, the FARC launched a major military offensive, defeating the Colombian National 
Army in several battles. The offensive culminated with the overthrow of a military base in Las Delicias, where the FARC 
took dozens of Colombian troops hostage.4 At the height of its power in 1999, the FARC was estimated to comprise over 
18,000 active members. 
In response to the FARC’s alarming growth and shocking series of military attacks, high-profile kidnappings, and murders, 
in 1999 Colombia partnered with the United States to initiate Plan Colombia. The plan included a massive $9 billion military 
aid package that made it possible for Colombia’s newly modernized and well-trained military and police forces to launch 
an offensive of their own. Under President Uribe, defense forces cracked down heavily on the FARC, and within a decade 
the guerilla force was reduced by almost two-thirds to about 7,000 active members.5 
The FARC exemplifies all of the characteristics of a hybrid threat. This classification is important because it may lend 
insights into how the FARC might evolve and adapt during the current transition. If analyzed according to the common 
hybrid threat features, historical trends and future possibilities emerge. 
The FARC will devolve into loosely affiliated, regionally distributed cells: Blended tactics, flexible structures 
As the FARC Secretariat officially negotiates peace in Colombia, proxy groups are gaining power and influence throughout 
the region, mostly via criminal affiliates. The Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), also known as the Mata Zetas or Zeta 
Killers, is just one FARC-trained narco-terror group gaining notoriety in Mexico. According to a leaked document from 
Mexico’s intelligence service, CJNG is eagerly recruiting former FARC terrorists in an effort to capitalize on their expertise 
with improvised explosives and guerilla tactics. Former FARC operatives have helped the CJNG rise to become the most 
powerful narco-trafficking faction in Mexico. The cartel brashly engages in firefights with military forces, and has even 
shot down military helicopters.6 
The FARC has also heavily infiltrated the Venezuelan military at the highest levels. Known as “Cartel of the Suns” after the 
insignia of Venezuelan generals, military handlers manage cocaine transactions throughout the region. In 2008, the US 
froze the assets of three Venezuelan generals who were known associates of the FARC narco-trafficking syndicate.7 As 
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Venezuela falls further into chaos, it provides an attractive sanctuary for former FARC operatives who may not support 
the peace process. It seems likely that as the FARC’s central authority, or Secretariat, moves towards disarmament, splinter 
groups will continue to perpetuate violence and protect criminal interests. 
IED and terrorist attacks by the FARC are likely to continue: Terrorism, blended tactics 
Weakened militant groups frequently transition to guerrilla tactics, and the FARC is no exception. Following the Uribe 
administration’s crackdown from 2002 through 2010, the FARC launched a renewed series of kidnappings and also 
deployed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as a new weapon of choice. IED attacks accounted for a total of 707 
casualties in Colombia in 2013 alone.8 This transition toward a preference for IED attacks is alarming when taken in the 
context of hybrid-threat adaptations. IEDs are difficult to attribute, which allows for ambiguous attacks to continue in the 
midst of peace negotiations. Moreover, bomb-making materials might well be overlooked during the FARC disarmament 
process and are, at any rate, readily available. 
As the FARC and the Colombian government continue on the path toward peace, defense and intelligence authorities 
should consider the probability of continued IED and terror attacks by clandestine operatives or criminal affiliates. Indeed, 
unconfirmed accounts indicate that the FARC is already exploiting the obscurity of these attacks to violate the ceasefire 
agreement. For example, a Colombian police checkpoint in an important FARC drug-trafficking corridor in northern 
Colombia was targeted with a command-detonated IED in July 2015. Police concluded that it was “mostly likely” that the 
attack was orchestrated by the FARC’s 36th Front.9 More recently, a criminal affiliate known as the First Front of the FARC 
is suspected to have assassinated a 22-year-old university student and Barranquillita mayoral office intern in the Guaviare 
district on 13 September 2017.10 
The FARC’s vast criminal enterprise casts doubt on peaceful overtures: Criminal activity, disregard for international law 
Non-state hybrid threats usually profess a counter-culture philosophy, but must rely on sponsorship and crime to fund 
their movements. In many cases, the vast revenues generated by the criminal enterprise begin to take precedence over 
ideological pursuits. Many Western analysts would categorize today’s FARC more as an organized criminal syndicate than 
the sociopolitical communist insurgency upon which it was founded. Even the highest-ranking FARC leaders acknowledge 
this reality. Carlos Antonio Lozada, the youngest member of the FARC’s seven-member Secretariat, is the UN-appointed 
FARC representative responsible for negotiating the peace accord. In an interview with the New Yorker, Lozada described 
his former work for the FARC as “financial and military,” hinting vaguely at his role in managing FARC revenues primarily 
derived from cocaine trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion. Although Lozada is pushing for an ambitious reintegration 
program for former FARC combatants, he is surprisingly frank about the prospects of turning erstwhile drug runners into 
productive citizens. As Lozada himself confesses, “Unless they have a very strong ideological understanding, some will be 
vulnerable to the appeal of the narco world.”11 
FARC leaders have been careful to avoid any promises to dismantle their extensive drug-trafficking network. Even if the 
Secretariat desired to renounce the drug trade, it would be unlikely to persuade its lieutenants within Colombia, much 
less regional cells in Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil. FARC regional commands may even cooperate or merge with former 
adversaries and competitors, including National Liberation Army guerrillas, bandas criminales (BACRIM), and the 
Urabeños. Indeed, it appears that a new underground network led by FARC regional commands is ambitiously engaged in 
arms thefts, drug trafficking, forced recruitment, and murder, even as the FARC’s leadership negotiates reconciliation 
terms. This past summer, the Colombian navy intercepted over two tons of marijuana in Caquetá district. In July, security 
forces in Meta district uncovered a dissident cell comprised of former FARC 7th Front leaders carrying out extortions, IED 
attacks, and forced recruitment of child soldiers in an effort to consolidate their control over key drug-trafficking corridors 
leading to Venezuela and Brazil.12 
Implications for Colombia’s Defense and Security Forces 
Having orchestrated a successful decade-long offensive that greatly reduced the FARC’s conventional military capacity, 
the Colombian Armed Forces are in the midst of re-aligning their priorities and considering their future capability 
requirements. It is important at this juncture to sustain a high state of readiness, with an aim to deter and prevent a 
reconstitution of the FARC or the emergence of a similarly empowered dissident faction to fill the current power vacuum. 
Colombia’s highly capable and professional defense and police forces must sustain their momentum and establish a viable 
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long-term, legitimate security environment for Colombia’s citizens. There are several key tasks that will be essential to 
ensuring the FARC stays on the back foot, while solidifying government gains: 
1. Enhance regional intelligence cooperation. The FARC criminal network is spread throughout the region. It is 
essential that affected nations, especially Brazil and Mexico, harmonize their intelligence and operations to 
counter the FARC and other regionally distributed criminal syndicate operations. 
2. Sustain robust surveillance. Colombia should sustain and expand security surveillance and enforcement in 
remote regions of the country and cross-border safe havens, where limited government security presence 
emboldens criminal activity. It needs to closely monitor evolving and emergent organized criminal groups to 
determine how they will confront, absorb, or align with former FARC dissidents, especially at the FARC regional-
command level. 
3. Secure FARC sanctuaries. FARC-affiliated splinter groups and cartels still operate with impunity in many remote 
parts of Colombia, especially drug-trafficking arteries in the central and eastern departments of Meta, Caquetá, 
and Guaviare.13 The government must establish and sustain a robust police presence in these areas, supported 
by community outreach to win over populations long accustomed to FARC control. 
4. Continue to support whole-of government development efforts. Colombian military and police capabilities are 
already being employed to build roads to isolated areas, conduct coca eradication to support legitimate 
agricultural development, and clear landmines in former FARC strongholds. This effort should be sustained and 
expanded to include engineering assets to improve infrastructure, provision of interim communications support 
to remote areas, and vetting and recruitment of locally sourced security forces who have a vested interest in the 
long-term, legitimate security of their villages.14 
Conclusion 
Despite peaceful overtures, the FARC remains a hybrid threat. The FARC Secretariat, once a central figure for coordinating 
the FARC’s direction and actions, now struggles to sustain a united front as its ideological foundations are shaken by 
criminal interests, regional alliances of convenience, and a message that is undermined by the failures of communism in 
the region. Whether it will ultimately transform into a legitimate political party, pursue sanctuary in at-risk neighboring 
states, or devolve into a regionally distributed narco-terrorist network remains to be seen. In the interim, Colombia’s 
Defense Forces must be prepared to respond to this highly adaptive, regionally distributed threat. 
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